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The proof of the pudding is in the eating. 
Abstract: 
We present examples where the use of belief 
functions provided sound and elegant solutions 
to real life problems. These are essentially 
characterized by 'missing' information. The 
examples deal with 1) discriminant analysis 
using a learning set where classes are only 
partially known; 2) an information retrieval 
systems handling inter-documents relationships; 
3) the combination of data from sensors 
competent on partially overlapping frames; 4) 
the determination of the number of sources in a 
multi-sensor environment by studying the inter­
sensors contradiction. The purpose of the paper 
is to report on such applications where the use of 
belief functions provides a convenient tool to 
handle 'messy' data problems. 
Keywords: belief function, hints model, transferable 
belief model. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The models proposed to represent quantified uncertainty 
are based on probability, possibility or belief functions. 
They are complementary, as they cover different forms of 
uncertainty (Smets, 1998a). We consider here only those 
based on belief functions, in particular the hint model and 
the transferable belief model (TBM). 
Showing one theory is better than another is often just 
impossible, as it requires a clear definition of 'better'. 
Better in what sense? Usually there are no definitive and 
absolute quality criteria, and most used criteria are either 
ad hoc or biased toward one theory. 
What can then be done in order to compare models? 
l. One can compare the underlying axioms and evaluate 
their respective adequacy and naturalness. Such axioms 
exist for each model, but there is no criterion that tells 
which one is really adequate. 
2. One can compare the consequences of the various 
models and discard those leading to inadequate 
conclusions. But the conclusions to which they lead, are 
usually defendable, even when they don't agree, and there 
is no golden standard to select the 'winner'. 
3. One can compare their abilities to solve small artificial 
delicate problems. But toy examples like the 3 prisoners, 
the 3 doors, the 'Peter, Paul and Mary Saga' don't lead to 
clear conclusions, as the merits of the solutions cannot be 
assessed definitively. 
4. One can compare their usefulness in solving 'real' 
problems. This is what we try to do here by presenting 
some problems where the belief function approach was 
quite convenient. 
A very important point when modeling uncertainty is to 
be clear about what is modeled, an obvious preliminary 
step that some skip too easily. Both probability and belief 
functions based models represented the weighted opinion 
of an agent that the actual world belongs to a given set of 
possible worlds, or equivalently that a given proposition 
is true in the actual world. Thus there is something called 
the 'actual world' and it has to be made clear what is really 
meant before even applying any model. In the actual 
world, as considered here, every proposition is either true 
or false: there is no fuzziness (belief on fuzzy events has 
been defined, but is not considered here). 
It would be nice to compare the results obtained with 
belief functions with those one could obtain with a 
probabilistic approach. Some comparisons are presented 
here. But we realize the difficulty encountered when 
trying such a comparison. In fact belief functions are used 
when some of the data needed for a probability analysis 
are missing. If all such data were available, they should be 
fed into the belief function analysis ... in which case the 
model reduces itself into the probability model. The 
whole argument about using belief functions centers on 
how the missing information is handled. Probabilists 
usually solve the problem by introducing some 'natural' 
assumptions like equi-probabilities, independence, or a 
modelization of the missing-ness. If these assumptions are 
'close' to reality, the probability solution is often optimal, 
in which case using a belief functions approach is useless 
(we just hope that belief functions produce results almost 
as good as those obtained with probability functions). The 
real interest of the belief functions approach is to be found 
in its robustness to discrepancies between the assumptions 
and the reality. E.g., Appriou (1997) shows an analysis 
dealing with missile recognition where the belief 
functions approach was much more robust to these 
discrepancies than the probabilistic approach. 
Besides, comparing the two approaches is difficult, as 
there are many methods to handle the missing information 
in probability theory. Bad results observed with 
probability functions could then be explained either by a 
weakness of the probability approach or by an inadequate 
choice of the method. Deciding which one applies is 
delicate. 
We describe four examples where belief functions models 
produce nice and efficient solutions. These examples are 
more or less 'real life' examples. We nevertheless limit 
our presentation to simplified illustrations; their 
generalization to large-scale applications is immediate. 
These examples were essentially developed by Thierry 
Denoeux, University of Compiegne, France (Denoeux, 
1995), by Johan Schubert, Royal Institute of Technology, 
Stockholm, Sweden (Schubert, 1995), by Justin Picard, 
Universite de Neuchatel, Switzerland (Picard, 1998) and 
by Janez, ONERA, Paris, France, (Janez, 1996). Another 
application of the TBM is presented in the paper 
'Assessing the value of a candidate' by Dubois et al. 
(1999, see in this proceeding). The first application is 
presented in some detail and includes a comparison with 
probabilistic approach. For lack of space, the other three 
examples are just shortly described. Their authors 
describe in full detail the methods used and their interest. 
This paper only reports on the use of belief functions in a 
few real applications recently developed. In depth 
comparisons with other methods are still missing. 
Benchmark exercises should be organized. 
2. UNCERTAINTY AND BELIEF 
FUNCTIONS. 
Shafer (1976) introduces a model to represent quantified 
beliefs based on so-called belief functions. Since, many 
new results have been obtained that we survey here. We 
neglect the computational issue: valuation based system, 
fast Mobius transform and approximation methods are 
detailed in (Gabbay and Smets, 1998-99, vol. 5). 
In AI, Shafer's model was called 'Dempster-Shafer 
theory' (Gordon and Shortliffe, 1984). Unfortunately what 
this name covers varies widely from authors to authors 
(Smets, 1994). It can correspond to: 
1. a lower probability model, 
2 .  Dempster's model derived from probability theory 
(Dempster, 1967) and represented by the hints theory 
of Kohlas (Kohlas and Monney, 1995), 
3 . Shafer's model unrelated to probability theory 
(Shafer, 1977, 1992) and represented by the 
transferable belief model (Smets and Kennes, 1994, 
Smets 1997a, 1998). 
The confusion between these interpretations explains 
most errors encountered in the literature where authors 
analyze Shafer's ideas. 
2.1. The lower probability model. 
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Let a set Q, and let IT be a set of probability functions 
defined on Q. The lower probability of a subsets A of Q is 
defined as: 
P·(A) = min Pen P(A) for every A�Q. 
The P. function is also called the lower envelope of IT. 
Under certain weak constraints P. is a Choquet capacity 
monotone of order 2, and it might even be monotone of 
order infinite, in which case P. is a belief function. In all 
these cases, P• and IT are in one-to-one correspondence. 
There are at least two ways to get IT. 
1. There exist a P function on Q band the agent knows 
only that P belongs to IT. It can also be obtained by 
studying betting behaviors and calling P•(A) the 
maximal price the agent, called the player, would pay 
to a banker to enter a game where the player gets from 
the banker $1 if A occurs, and nothing otherwise 
(Walley, 1991). (The difference with the Bayesian 
definition is that the agent cannot be forced to be the 
banker). 
2 .  Beliefs are represented by families of probability 
functions that can be defined through their lower 
envelop p. (Kyburg, 1987, Voorbraak, 1993). 
An important issue when developing a model to represent 
beliefs is to explain its behavior when new pieces of 
evidence are introduced like in the conditioning process. 
In the first interpretation, the solution is obvious: every 
probability function in IT is conditioned by Bayes rule on 
A�Q, and p. A is the lower envelop of this new set of 
probability functions (Jaffray, 1992). These results were 
often used to criticize Dempster's rule of conditioning, 
and indirectly Shafer's work. This comparison is 
inappropriate, as Dempster's rule of conditioning is not 
justified in this context. This approach is not further 
considered here after as belief functions are only 
marginally concerned. 
2.2. The theory of hints. 
Historically, the use of belief functions was initiated by 
Dempster while justifying fiducial inference (Dempster, 
1967, 1968). Today its most developed model is the hint 
theory of Kohlas and Monney (1995). They assume 
Dempster's oriBinal structure (Q, P, r. 8) where Q and e are two sets, P is a probability measure on Q and r is a 
one-to-many mapping from Q to e. The set e is the set of 
possible answers to a question whose answer is unknown. 
One and only one element of e is the correct answer to 
the question. 'The goal is to make assertions about the 
answer in the light of the available information. 
We assume that this information allows for several 
different interpretations, depending on some unknown 
circumstances. These interpretations are regrouped into 
the set Q and there is exactly one correct interpretation. 
Not all interpretations are equally likely and the known 
probability measure pil reflects our information in that 
respect. Furthermore, if the interpretation roe Q is the 
correct one, then the answer is known to be in the subset 
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f(w)�e. Such a structure H = (Q, P, I', 8) is called a 
hint. .. An interpretation WE Q supports the hypothesis H if 
f(w)�H because in that case the answer is necessarily in 
H. The degree of support of H is defined as the 
probability of all supporting interpretation of H' (Kohlas 
and Mooney, 1995, page vi). 
The hints theory is similar to the probability of 
provability theory (Ruspini, 1986, Pearl, 1988, Smets, 
199la, 1993b), a theory that extends the domain of the 
probability functions from propositional logic to modal 
logic. 
2.3. The transferable belief model. 
Shafer (1976) proposes to quantify beliefs with belief 
functions, instead of probability functions as classically 
used for that purpose. He introduces the model and both 
Dempster's rule of conditioning that correspond to the 
Bayes conditioning rule, and Dempster's rule of 
combination that correspond to the probability 
aggregation rule. 
From these ideas, we develop the TBM, a non­
probabilistic model for representing the quantified beliefs 
held by an agent. 
Let You denote the agent whose beliefs are considered, 
but it should be realized that an agent can also be a piece 
of equipment, a computer program, a sensor, etc ...  
Subjectivity is not essential. Your beliefs manifest 
themselves at two mental levels: the credal level where 
beliefs are entertained and represented by belief 
functions, and the pignistic level where beliefs are used to 
act and represented by probability functions. 
Suppose a frame of discernment Q on which Your beliefs 
are considered. One world in Q is the actual world, 
denoted w0. You can only express the strength of Your 
opinion, Your belief, that Wo belongs to this or that subset 
of Q. You allocate parts of Your belief to the fact that 
WoE A for every A�Q. The part of belief, denoted m(A), 
given to A�Q represents the part of Your belief that 
specifically supports the fact that oo0E A and no set more 
specific than A. The total amount of belief, denoted 
bel(B), that supports WoE B is obtained by adding the 
parts of belief m(A) given to the sets A, At0, A�. 
When You must take decisions, the belief held at the 
credal level, and represented by the basic belief 
assignment m defined on Q, induces a probability 
function at the 'pignistic' level, denoted BetP and also 
defined on Q. The transformation is called the pignistic 
transformation (Smets, 1989): 
m(A) 1 BetP(x) = L for every xE Q. 
A!;;;Q,xeA 1- m(0) I A I 
This probability function can be used in order to make 
decisions using expected utilities theory. Its justification 
is based on rationality requirements detailed in (Smets 
and Kennes, 1994) 
The operational definition of a degree of belief is based 
on the agent's betting behaviors and its assessment is 
based on exchangeable bets just as it is done for 
subjective probabilities (Smets and Kennes, 1994) 
The axiomatic of the TBM as a model to represent 
quantified beliefs is detailed in Smets (1993A, 1997a), 
(see also Wong et a!., 1990). Axiomatic justification for 
combination rules is given in (Smets, 1990, Dubois and 
Prade, 1986, Hajek, 1992, Klawonn and Schwecke 1992). 
The generalization of the Bayesian Theorem to the TBM 
is presented in Smets 1978, 1993b). Decision process 
based on lower expectations are explained in Strat, ( 1990) 
Jaffray (1989), whereas Wilson (1993) studies the 
properties of the pignistic probabilities and Smets (1993c) 
examines what become the pignistic transformations in a 
dynamic decision making context. 
Revision of beliefs by specialization are described in 
(Kruse and Schwecke, 1990, Klawonn and Smets, 1992) 
and several general combination rules have been 
developed (Dempster's rule of combination is hardly the 
only rule for combining two belief functions. There are 
many other rules, like the disjunctive rule of combination 
(Smets, 1993d), the a-combination rules (Smets, 1997b, 
the cautious combination rules, etc . . .  ). 
Principles of information content have been developed. 
Measures extending entropy measure are detailed in (Klir 
and Wierman, 1998), whereas we develop a measure 
adapted to the TBM (Smets, 1983). Principle of minimal 
commitment that states 'never give more support to a set 
that necessary' replaces the maximum entropy principle 
used in probability theory (Hsia, 1991) 
Classically bel(A) quantifies 'I have good reason to 
believe A' and bel(A) is the strength of these 'good 
reasons'. In (Smets, 1995), we show how to represents 
concepts like 'good reasons not to believe', a concept 
similar in logic to the retraction a Ia Giirdenfors. 
Similarly, we can also express concepts like 'I still have 
some reasons to believe', and 'I still have some reasons 
not to believe'. 
2.4. Future developments. 
Many new developments have been achieved since 
Shafer's seminal work. Limiting oneself to the theory as 
presented in Shafer's book is no more acceptable. The 
distinction between the three interpretations for belief 
functions seems essential but it deserves further work to 
validate or invalidate it. Works on belief revisions -
finding their nature and the adequate rules for 
representing their effect - are necessary. Dempster's rule 
of conditioning fits just one kind of revision. There are 
still open theoretical issues but it is obvious that real life 
applications are needed before the interest of the model 
can be assessed. In Europe there are already quite a few 
applications under development. They usually concern 
problems where some information essential for a 
probability approach is missing and cannot be obtained. 
The way belief functions can adequately represent partial 
or total ignorance is usually acknowledge. Belief 
functions are used for pattern recognition, multi -sensor 
data fusion, diagnosis... A nice property of belief 
functions is that only what is known is used. 
3. THE TBM CLASSIFIER. 
Discriminant analysis is probably the most classical tool 
used for classifying cases into one of several categories 
given the values of some measurement variables. 
Normally, we use a set of data, called the learning set 
(LS). For each case in LS, we know the values taken for 
each measurement variable and the classification variable 
that tells the class to which the case belongs. The classes 
are finite and unordered. Let Q denote the set of possible 
classes: Q = {CJ, Cz,oo., cnl· 
A learning set with N cases and p measurement variables 
is the set {(Cj, xu. x2;, oo• xp;): i = I , 2 ... N} where X; is the 
'name' of the i'th case, c; is the class to which X; belongs, 
and Xji is the value of the measurement variable j for X;. 
The data of a new case, denoted X?. is collected, but the 
class to which X? belongs, denoted C?, is unknown. We 
want to predict the value of c? given the observed values 
of the measurement variables of X?· Solutions to this 
problem are well established. One of them, called 
discriminant analysis, is fully described in most textbooks 
of statistics. 
Let us now suppose that instead of the ideal learning set 
LS as described here above, we have a learning set PKLS 
where the classes of the cases are only partially known. 
For instance suppose we only know that case X1 belongs 
either to CJ or Cz class, that case Xz does not belong to 
class CJo case X3 belongs either to Cz or cs or c7 class ... 
Can we adapt the discriminant analysis method to such 
'messy' data case? In fact we face a problem of 'partially 
supervised learning'. For some cases, classes are known as 
in the supervised learning approach, for some cases, class 
in completely as in the unsupervised approach. But here 
we also have all the cases where we know partially their 
class. Probabilistic solutions could be based on: 
1. a Bayesian approach where we assess for each case a 
probability function that describes the class to which 
it belongs. We then allocate every case to a class (and 
get the probability to get that learning set), compute 
the needed parameters as in a supervised learning 
approach and average the results weighted by the 
probability of the learning sets. 
2. a maximum likelihood approach where we estimate 
the unknown parameters, including the probability 
with which the case belong to a given class. 
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3 . an adaptation of cluster analysis where partial 
constraints are introduced that represent the 
knowledge about the class to which each case belong. 
Whatever method is used, the computational complexity 
is a serious problem and an adequate tuning of some 
parameters is not a small matter. The transferable belief 
model provides another approach that can handle 
elegantly and efficiently such a messy case. The method 
was invented by Denoeux (1995). We present results of 
the method - called the TBM classifier - and compare 
them with those obtained by the classical discriminant 
analysis applied to the same data base but using the exact 
value for the classes, a method that is then optimal. 
Details about these results are given in Denoeux (1995), 
Zouhal (1997), De Smet (1998). 
3.1. Discriminant Analysis with Partially 
Known Classes 
Let pkc; denote the subset of Q that represents what we 
know about the class to which case X; belongs. The 
learning set PKLS is now the set {(pkc;, xu. xz;, 000 Xp;): i 
= 1, 2 ... N} 
Intuitively the method can be described by an 
anthropomorphic model. Each case X; in PKLS is 
considered as an individual. Let c;o denoted the true class 
to which X; belongs. All X; knows about cw is that 
c;oE pkc; (Denoeux andZouhal ( 1999) generalizes to the 
case where this knowledge is represented by a belief 
function or possibility function on Q). Then X; looks at 
the unknown case and expresses 'his' belief bel; about C?. 
If X? is 'close' to X;, X; would defend that C? = c;o. As all 
what X; knows about c;o is that ewE pkc;, then all what X; 
can express about case X? is that c ?E pkc;. If X? is not 
'close' to X;, X; cannot say anything about c;o. 
This description is formalized as follows. X; can only 
states: case X? belongs to the same set of classes as 
myself, what is represented by a belief function with 
m;o(pkc;) = 1. Let d(X;,X?) be the 'distance' between X; 
and X?. If d(X;.X?) is small, then what X; stated is 
reliable, if d(X;,X?) is large, it is not reliable, the largest 
d(X;,X? ), the less reliable. The impact of this reliability is 
represented by a discounting on m;o into m;. So lllj(pkc;) = 
f(d(X;,X?)) and m;(Q) = 1-f(d(X;,X?)) where f(d)E [0,1] 
and is decreasing with d. Thus every case X; generates 
such a simple support function be\ on Q that concerns the 
value of C?· 
Consider now what information X? collects. Case X7 
receives all these simple support functions bel;, and 
combines them by Dempster's rule of combination into a 
new belief function bel on Q that represents the belief 
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held by case X? about c? and induced by the collected 
belief functions beli: 
bel? = Etli;J...N beli. 
If a decision must be made on the value of C?, we build 
the pignistic probability BetP? on Q from bel7 by the 
application of the pignistic transformation (described and 
justified in Smets and Kennes, 1994) and use the classical 
expected utility theory in order to take the optimal 
decision. 
In the comparison study presented here after (and done by 
Y. De Smet 1998), we use the next solutions. Each 
measurement variable in PKLS is linearly re-scaled so 
that their 5th percentile is 0 and their 95th percentile is l. 
So measurement variables share similar scales, and the 
method is robust to outliers. 
For f, he uses: f(d) = max(l - a d, 0) with a>O. More 
elaborated formulas were useless. For d, he uses the D2 of 
Mahalanobis using a covariance matrix :Ei that depends on 
Xi and which parameters are based on the cases in the 
neighborhood of Xi. 
De Smet applied this approach to many sets of data. We 
present only six case studies. The quality criterion used in 
all comparisons is the classical PCC (percent of correct 
classification). The predicted class is always the class 
with the highest pignistic probability (the most probable 
class). Furthermore in every artificial case study, the pkc 
is never erroneous, i.e. the true class of Xi belongs always 
to pkci. 
Case Study 1. Isosceles triangle, AB/AC/BC. 
Suppose a two dimensional (p=2) trigroup classification 
problem with group labels A, B, C. Data in the three 
groups are normally distributed, their means are at the 
comer of an isosceles triangle with coordinate (0,0), ( 4,0) 
and (2,2), and the covariance matrix is the unit matrix. 
200 cases are randomly generated in the 3 groups. Each 
set of 200 cases is split in two subsets of 100 cases, those 
in the first subsets having their label transformed into 
{ A,B } , the others into { A,C}. The same is done for the 
other two groups. The learning set is made out of 20 A, 20 
B, 20 C cases (randomly selected), the other case making 
the testing set. Table 1 presents the PCC obtained for 5 
unrelated sets of data by the TBM -classifier (denoted 
TBM with pkc). For comparison purpose, we also present 
the PCC obtained by linear discriminant analysis, denoted 
DA, applied to the same data sets but using the true 
classes for the data in the learning set. Both methods 
produce similar results, an excellent result for what 
concerns the TBM-classifier. Indeed it only uses the 
partially known classes whereas the DA uses precisely 
known classes, a much richer information, and 
furthermore DA is the optimal method for these data as 
they satisfy exactly the requirements underlying the use of 
DA. 
PCC 
1 TBM with pkc 93 93 92 89 94 
DA true class 94 94 93 93 92 
2 TBM with pkc 94 94 93 93 89 
DA true class 96 95 96 95 95 
3 TBM with pkc 85 8 1  84 86 80 
DA true class 88 86 89 85 86 
Table 1: For each case stud1es 1 to 3, PCC obtamed m 
five experiments with the TBM classifier using partially 
known classes and with discriminant analysis (DA) using 
the true classes. 
Case Study 2. Collinear, A/B/AC-BC. 
Data are generated as in case study 1, except the means 
are collinear, located at ( -3,0), (3,Q) and (0,0). The pkc of 
the A cases is A, and the pkc of the B cases is B (there is 
no missing information for these two sets of data). The C 
cases where all classified are either {A,C} or {B,C}. The 
difficulty comes from the fact that the C cases are 
essentially located between the A and B cases. The results 
in table 2 support the conclusions of case study l .  
Case Study 3. 5 classes, in &5 
We use p=5 and 5 classes, denoted A, B ... E. The mean of 
group 1 is located on the first axis at 2 .fi, for group 2, on 
the second axis at 2 .fi , etc ... The covariance matrix = I. 
The pkc are build as follows. Suppose a case in group 2 as 
indicated by the vector (0, 1, 0, 0, 0). Then for every 0 in 
the vector, we toss a fair coin: if heads we put a 1, if tails 
we leave the 0. Then the 1 's in the resulting vector 
indicate those subsets included in the pkc of that case. So 
if the end vector is (1, 1, 0, 1, 0), the pkc is {A, B, D}. 
The learning set is made out of 30 cases from each class. 
Even though the knowledge about the class was quite 
poor, the TBM-classifier provided results (see table 3) 
almost as good as the discriminant analysis approach 
applied on perfectly known classes (again optimal here). 
That the PCC with the TBM-classifier are lower is 
normal, no miracle can be expected, the TBM-classifier 
used a very imprecise information, and a method using 
more information should provided better results. 
cr2 TBM Classifier Linear Discrimination 
10 84 85 
15 78 79 
20 75 77 
25 75 77 
30 73 74 
50 65 65 
Table 2: Case study 4: 1mpact of large vanances. 
Case Study 4. Triangle, No pkc. 
In order to see if the TBM-classifier behaves well when 
the classes are precisely known, we use the isosceles 
triangle of case study 1, with side length = 10, and a 
covariance matrix cr2J with cr2 varying from 10 to 50. The 
linear discriminant is against the optimal method in such a 
case. Table 2 shows that the TBM-classifier performs as 
well as the linear discriminant method, whatever a2. 
Case Study 5. Collinear, No pkc. 
As in cased study 2, we use 3 groups with 100 cases per 
group and the means are collinear located at ( 10,0) (20,0) 
(30,0). With the covariance matrices LA = LB = Lc = 50.1, 
both the TBM and the linear discriminant classifiers 
produce PCC of 69%. When LA = LC = 10.1 and LB = 
('� �), the PCC are 73% for the TBM classifier and 
51% for the linear discriminant classifier (which condition 
for optimality are unsatisfied here, but in real life it is not 
obvious to realize it and linear discriminant classifiers are 
often applied in such cases). The nice conclusion is that 
the TBM classifier is robust against such bad data. 
Case Study 6: Real Data, no pkc. 
We move now to real data where the classes are precisely 
known, just to show that the TBM-classifier behaves 
similarly to some of its competitors (De Caestekere, 
1997). She uses a !-Nearest Neighbor classifier, a multi­
layers perceptron method, a prototype Nearest Neighbor 
method and we apply to the same data sets the TBM­
classifier. these classifiers are applied to the too famous 
Iris data set, the diabetes data set and the wave data sets 
presented in De Caestekere. Their major characteristics 
are presented in table 3. Data where used as given, or with 
added white noises. Results of the TBM-classifier (table 
4) are as good as those obtained with the other three 
approaches that are usually acknowledged as being 
among the best. 
Data Set Dimension Classes Training Test 
Iris 1 4 3 75 75 
Iris 2 4 3 30 120 
Wave 21 3 300 5000 
Diabetes 5 3 71 74 
Table 3: MaJor charactenst1cs of the data sets used m 
table 4. 
Data 1-NN MLP PNN TBM 
Iris I 94.2 96.8 93.8 90.8 
Iris 2 94,7 96,0 95,6 95,7 
Iris l B  79,3 81,5 82,0 78,0 
Iris 2B 80.7 83.0 83.0 82.8 
Diabetes 97.3 98.0 99.1 93.5 
Wave 76.4 84.9 83.8 82.5 
Table 4: PCC observed on data of table 3 w1th four 
classification methods. 
The conclusions of the comparisons based on the six case 
studies illustrated here (and many others done buy De 
Smet) are: 
4. when the classes are precisely known, the TBM­
classifier performs almost as well as the classical 
classifiers. 
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5. the TBM-classifier can be used in cases where classes 
are partially known, in which cases performance is 
still very good. 
That the TBM-classifier can be applied in the case of 
partially known classes provides its real interest, as such 
messy data situations can hardly be handled with the 
classical tools as available today. 
3.2. Partial knowledge is real life. 
It seems the TBM -classifier provides a nice tool, but does 
it fill a real need. The answer is affirmative. Real life 
hardly complies with the perfect knowledge usually 
required by classical statistical tools. Real life is messy 
data, not idealized data as one hopes for. As an example, 
consider the clinician who collect during the 1980's the 
data from 300 hundred patients suffering from a given 
disease Dx. In the 80's such patients were classified as A 
or B? Then as science advances, a new category C is 
described for patients with disease Dx. So during the 90's, 
our clinician collect 200 data classified as A, B or C. The 
clinician comes to you and asks for a computerized 
classifier. How to handle the first 300 cases, the A cases 
were in fact A or C, and the B cases were B or C, and their 
exact classes cannot be re-assessed. Are you going to 
throw away the 300 cases as useless . . .  With the TBM­
classifier, you can proceed with all the 500 cases, whereas 
a plain statistical analysis would have serious troubles with 
the learning set. 
Suppose another clinician who collects data in 4 classes 
denoted A, B, C and D. 
Then regulation or knowledge changes and these cases are 
supposed to be classified into three classes, denoted X, Y 
and Z, where all A cases are now X cases, all D cases are 
now Z cases, and the B cases turn out to be either X or Y 
cases, and the C cases turn out to be either Y or Z cases. 
How to handle the old database? This is exactly what is 
illustrated by case study 2. 
Suppose a disease with 3 forms denoted A, B and C and 
three clinicians, denoted a, b, and c. Dr. a can only 
differentiate between A and not-A cases. The A cases are 
treated by Dr. a, the not-A cases are send to the hospital H. 
The same scenario holds for Dr. b where A is replaced by 
B, and for Dr. c where A is replaced by C. So at hospital 
H, the only cases they treat where classified as not-A, not­
E or not-C, and there is no way to find out what was the 
exact class of these patients (as if the only available 
information is the name of the sending doctor). This is 
exactly what is illustrated by case study 1. 
This shows that 'artificial' examples are not that artificial. 
It would be interesting to compare these results when 
classes are only partially known with other techniques. 
The major difficulty is of course in the construction of 
alternate methods based on probability theory as extra 
assumptions will have to be fed into the models, and the 
quality of the results will strongly depends on the 
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adequacy of these assumptions. In practice the user is not 
aware of this adequacy before using the classifier. 
4. PAS FOR INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL. 
Justin Picard (1998) applies the Probabilistic 
Argumentation Systems, denoted PAS, (Kohlas and 
Haenni, 1999), an adaptation of the hint model, and a 
generalization of the ATMS of Laskey and Lehner (1989) 
to a problem of information retrieval, using in particular 
the CACM collection (3204 documents, 50 queries). Let a 
query Q, a set of documents Di and the citation links 
between them, denoted Citing(Di, Dj). The citation link 
reflects the idea that if a document Di is relevant to Q and 
cites Dj, then Dj is probably also relevant to Q. For each 
document Di, he introduces an assumption ai. When 
assumption ai holds then Di is relevant to Q. When 
assumption ai does not hold, then nothing can be 
concluded about the relevance of Di to Q. To assess the 
probability Ui that assumption ai holds, he uses the rank of 
Di as provided by the search engines present on the Web. 
He fits Ui by a logistic regression. 
exp -2.42ln(ranlq )+ 1.11 
Uj = --'-----,..,..,.,....,�.,......;"77 -,-;-
1+exp 2.42ln(ranlq)+l.ll 
Picard then builds the PAS for modeling document 
relationship like the one in figure 5. The numerous cycles 
in the graph should be enhanced; they do not create any 
problem when using the PAS methodology. Another 
assumption Iij is introduced. If there is a citation link 
between Di and Dj, if Di is relevant to Q and if Iij holds 
then document Dj is also relevant to Q. If Iij does not hold, 
noting can be concluded about the relevance of Dj to Q 
that would result from the citation link between them. He 
accepts that the probability A. that Iij holds does not depend 
on the documents involved. The fitted value for A. is .2644. 
165 � 135 
r 154 
as 34 
The figure represents 'graphically a PAS for a collection 
of six documents having some document relationships. 
Rules are represented by arrows and assumptions by 
w h i t e  d o t t e d  c i r c l e s  ( e . g . ,  a 1  � D�o 
az�Dz, ... DIAI12�Dz ... ) One can see that the support of 
D6 (or any document) corresponds to all existing path 
from any a priori assumption to D6: the support of 06 is 
36V(a1Al16)· D6 can thus be "proven" either by the 
retrieval system (argument a6) or by document D1 
through the link from D1 to D6 (argument a1Al16)· 
Document D4 illustrates how PAS deal with cycles. There 
are links from D4 to D3, D:> to Ds and Ds to D4. Even if 
there is a cycle here, evidence is counted only once: recall 
that the support of D4 is the disjunction of all arguments 
for which D4 becomes true. asAls4 is one such argument. 
Since it implicitly contains (asAls4Al43Al3sAls4) ( = 
asAls4Al43Al3s) which would correspond to the cycle D4-
D3-Ds-D4, this last argument is not considered. Anyway, 
the algorithm for determining the symbolic support 
eliminates cycles.' (Quotations are from Picard, 1998). 
5. SENSORS ON PARTIALLY 
OVERLAPPING FRAMES. 
Suppose a sensor S 1 that has been trained to recognize A 
objects and B objects and another sensor Sz that has been 
trained to recognize B objects and C objects (like A = 
airplanes, B = helicopters and C = rockets). Sensor S1 
never saw a C object, and we know nothing on how S1 
would react if to a C object. Beliefs provides by S 1 are 
always on the frame of discernment {A, B}. The same 
holds for Sz with A and C permuted. A new object X is 
presented to the two sensors. Both sensor S1 and Sz 
express their belief m1 and m2, the first on the frame {A, 
B}, the second on the frame{B, C}. How to combine 
these two beliefs on a common frame Q = {A, B, C}? 
Solutions have been proposed in Janez (1996). 
Solutions are based on the next constraint. If both m1 and 
mz are conditioned on {B}, and combined b y  Dempster's 
rule of combination (unnormalized), the resulting belief 
function should be the same as the one obtained after 
'combining' the original m1 and mz on [A, B, C}, and 
conditioning the result on { B } . The problem is of course 
how to 'combine' m1 and m2. The original Dempster's 
rule of combination is inadequate as it requires that both 
belief functions are defined on the same frame of 
discernment, what is not the case here. 
A general solution is as follows. Let Q 1 and 02 be the 
frame of discernment of m1 and mz, respectively. Let 0 = 
01nOz. For all A � 01uOz, let A1 = An01, Az = 
An02, A0 = AnQ, and 
m(A) = ml (AJ) 
m2(A2) (mJ[Q]$m2[QJ)(AJ2) 
mJ[Q](Ao) m2[Q](Ao) 
where mi[Q] and mz[Q] are the basic belief assignments 
obtained by conditioning m1 and mz on Q. In table 5, we 
illustrate the computation. We have mi[B]$mz[B](B) = 
(.1+.3)*(.7+.1) = .32. This mass is distributed on {B}, (A, 
B}, {A, C} and {A, B, C} according to the next ratios: 
(.11.4).(.7/.8), (.3/.4).(.7/.8), (.11.4).(.11.8), and 
(.3/.4).(.11.8). In this example the first sensor supports that 
X is an A, whereas the second claims that X is a B. If X 
had been a B, how comes the first did not say so? So the 
second sensor is probably facing an A and just states B 
because it does not know what an A is. So we feel that the 
most plausible solution is X = A, what is confirmed by 
BetP12 being the largest for A: BetP12(A) = .455. 
Just to enhance the simplicity of the belief function 
solution, we examine what this problem would be when 
expressed within probability theory. Suppose two sensors 
S1 and Sz. Sensor S1 generates a probability function on 
{A, B, C), denoted P*1, but we only know P1 = 
P*I(.J(A,B }), the value of P*1 after conditioning it on {A, 
B }. The same holds for sensor Sz with Pz = P*z(./{B,C}). 
Aggregate P1 and Pz in order to derive a probability 
function on {A, B, C). The major issue is on how to 
reconstruct P*1 and P*z from P1 and Pz. It means how to 
'de-condition' a probability function on Q when all you 
know is the result of its conditioning on some strict subset 
of Q. Suppose Q = {a, b, c, d) and you know 
P({a}/{a,b)). What would be P({c}) and P({c,d})? There 
are infinitely many solutions. Introducing the maximum 
entropy principle leads to P( { c}) = .P( { d}) = .25 and 
P((a}) = .5 * P(a/{a,b}). Such a solution is strongly linked 
to the insufficient reason principle and suffers of all its 
weaknesses. 
Q ml mz m pi BetP 
{A} .6 .00 .92 455 
{B) . I  .7 .07 .32 190 
{C) .2 .00 .72 355 
{A, B) .3 .21 I 
{A, C) .68 .93 
{B, C) . I  .01 I 
IA, B, C} .03 I 
Table 5. Basic behef assignment m1 and mz on the two 
partially overlapping frames, with their combination m 
and its related plausibility and pignistic probability 
functions. 
6. ANALYZING CONTRADICTION 
AND THE NUMBER OF SOURCES. 
Suppose a piece of equipment has failed. We collect data 
from four sensors S1, S2, S3 and S4. Each sensor produces 
a belief function on the set of possible component that 
might have failed. Table 6 presents a highly simplified 
example where each sensor produces a simple support 
function pointing toward one component. S 1 and Sz both 
point toward component c 1, whereas s3 and s4 point 
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toward component Cz. If the four sources S1 to S4 were 
highly reliable, you would conclude that both C1 and Cz 
are broken. Indeed if only one has failed, the source are 
contradictory, whereas if two components have failed, 
results are coherent if S 1 and Sz report on one broken 
component and S3 and S4 report on a second broken 
component. 
Q ffiJ mz ffi3 ffi4 
c1 .7 .8 
Cz .6 .9 
Q .3 .2 .4 .I 
Table 6. The simple support functiOns generates by the 
four sensors on the frame of discernment Q = { C 1, Cz, ... 
Col· 
How do we translate this problem into belief functions 
language? The solution is obtained by considering the 
mass m(0) given to 0 that may be positive in the 
transferable belief model. When applying Dempster's rule 
of combination to two basic belief assignments m1 and 
mz, the result is given by: 
mu(A) = L, mi(X)mz(Y) for all A 0}.. 
X.Y�O.XnY=A 
We do not normalize the resulting basic belief assignment 
m12, m(0) is among the computed masses and it does not 
have to be 0 like in Shafer's original presentation. The 
mass m(0) quantifies the amount of contradiction 
between the various sources of belief functions. 
Schubert (1995) has proposed a strategy to decide the 
number of events under consideration by the various 
sensors producing the several collected belief functions. 
He analyses m(0) and finds the association between 
sensors and events that somehow brings the total conflict 
to an acceptable level . 
Suppose the data of table 6. If there is only one broken 
component the four sensors are speaking about the same 
event. The contradiction computed after combining the 
four basic belief assignments is 90, what reflect an 
enormous conflict between the four sources. If there is 
two broken components, then some sources might speak 
about one, the other about the second. So we split the four 
sensors into two groups, compute what is the 
contradiction within each group, and sum these 
contradictions. For instance, suppose sensors SI> S2 and 
S 3 speak about one component, then the contradiction is 
0.56, whereas there is no contradiction for sensor 4. Total 
contradiction is thus 0.56. Now if we consider that sensor 
S1 and S3 speak about one component, whereas S2 and S4 
speak about the other, the total contradiction is 1.14. 
Contradiction completely disappears when S1 and S2 are 
grouped as reporting on one component, and S3 and S4 on 
the second. This result fits with common sense analysis of 
the data. In real life applications, the basic belief 
assignments are usually quite elaborated, and finding an 
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adequate grouping is not obvious. The technique of 
'peeling' the mass given to the empty set (to the 
contradiction) is nevertheless still applicable. The level of 
'tolerable contradiction' is itself determined by the 
analysis of the conflict present in the given belief 
functions (and obtained by the use of the canonical 
decomposition of the belief functions (Smets, 1995)). 
The mass m(0) acts in fact as a measure of discrepancy 
between several belief functions. The proposed algorithm 
leads to grouping sources which belief functions are 
'close' to each other. In probability theory using cross­
entropy or chi-square coefficients can achieve this 
purpose. Comparisons between these approaches are not 
available (as far as we know). The advantage of the belief 
function approach resides in the well-founded nature of 
the approach. The mass m(0) is part of the transferable 
belief model, whereas the cross-entropy, the chi-square 
and the likes need always extra assumptions in order to 
justify their use. 
Groups Conflict 
G1 G2 Gl G2 total 
1234 - .90 - .90 
123 4 .56 .00 .56 
124 3 .85 .00 .85 
134 2 .67 .00 .67 
234 1 .77 .00 .77 
12 34 .00 .00 .00 
13 24 .42 .72 1.14 
14 23 .63 .48 1.11 
Table 7. Masses m(0) computed from the behef 
functions included in each group when considering two 
objects. 
7. FINAL REMARKS. 
We have presented a few 'real' life problems where the 
use of belief functions is interesting. These problems are 
characterized by the presence of some missing 
information that are needed to apply the probability 
approach. Probabilists normally try to obtain some 
'estimation' of the values for these missing data and apply 
their model with these data (using sensitivity analysis in 
order to check the robustness of their conclusions to 
reasonable variations around the guessed 'estimation'). 
Usually the belief function models do not need such 
assumptions and is well adapted to work with the 
information as really available. This power comes from 
the ability of belief functions to represent any form of 
uncertainty: full knowledge, partial ignorance, total 
ignorance (and even probability knowledge). Probability 
functions do not have such expressiveness power. £qui­
probability is not full ignorance, it is already a quite 
precise form of knowledge. 
In practice, the major interest of the belief function 
approach as presented here comes from its robustness 
(Appriou, 1997, Picard, 1998). When the 'estimations' of 
the missing data are close to what they are in reality, the 
probability model is normally perfect. But once 
differences increase between the 'estimations' and reality, 
the probability models deteriorate much faster then the 
belief function models. It is amazing to note that long 
before belief functions had been introduced, HUber ( 1973) 
had developed robust methods in statistics and his results 
have some similarity with those of the belief functions 
approach. 
The computational issue is real but as shown in these 
examples, it seems manageable. No serious studies are 
available on that issue. We feel that the computational 
complexity will be similar to those encountered in 
probability theory, but of course brute force approaches 
must be avoided. E.g., in the Schubert's example, it is 
obvious that the sensor clustering will not be achieved by 
testing every partition, and that some stepwise approaches 
have to be used. The fact that belief functions are defined 
on the power set, whereas probability functions are 
defined on the set has often been used as an argument 
against the use of belief functions. Theoretically the 
argument is correct, but in practice situations will hardly 
be so complex and there are even cases where the 
complexity is smaller with belief functions. In any case 
approximations will be used. 
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